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TO CHASTEN OR CHERISH THE CHASER:
AN ETHICAL DILEMMA
The ethical conduct of attorneys throughout the nation has been
a constant and ever-present concern of the legal profession.1 Con-
sequently, attorneys have burdened themselves with perhaps the
strictest codes of conduct of any profession. This is true at both
national2 and state3 levels with local control ensured by the establish-
ment of grievance committees in local bar associations which care-
fully scrutinize the conduct of suspect lawyers.' Despite these
precautions many laymen regard the legal profession as a group of
self-centered egoists primarily concerned with self-advancement and
gain, often to the detriment of individual clients and society as a
whole.5 Every lawyer is painfully aware that to some people the word
"shyster" is synonymous with attorney.6
Perhaps the lawyers most commonly accused of participating in
legal chicanery are those who specialize in personal injury litigation.7
Many colleagues, as well as laymen, are quick to label aggressive
participants "ambulance chasers," and those saddled with this label
have been repeatedly condemned by the legal community.'
The phrase "ambulance chasing" first appeared judicially in a
1 "The lawyer is a member of an ancient and honorable profession. His reputa-
tion is his chief working capital. Like a woman's virtue, to question it is to do
irreperable harm." Herron v. State Bar, 212 Cal. 196, 212, 298 P. 474, 480 (1931)
(dissent). See also W. BOULTON, CONDUCT AND ETIQUETTE AT THE BAR OF ENGLAND
AND WALES (3d ed. 1961); J. CARLIN, LAWYER'S ETHICS (1966); ABA SPECIAL COM-
MITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1970).
2 ABA, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969) [hereinafter cited as ABA
CODE].
3 As to the California State Bar's emphasis on the ethical conduct of its members,
See Guides to Professional Conduct for the New California Practitioner (1961). The
California Legislature has codified certain rules with respect to the conduct of
attorneys: CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6000-154 (West 1962). In January, 1965, the
California State Bar established a Committee on Professional Ethics. Its organization
and powers of authority are set out in 41 CAL. S.B.J. 815 (1966).
4 See generally R. MATHEWS, PROBLEMS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES
OF MEMBERS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 14 (1965) [hereinafter cited as MATHEWS].
5 See generally Winters, What Can Be Done About Pettifoggery and Legal
Delays?, ANNALS, Jan., 1966, at 55.
6 See generally Anderson, "Ambulance Chasing," 20 COMrMONWEAL 147 (1934).
7 For an interesting overview of the internal workings of a firm specializing in
personal injury litigation, see Bowman, An Inspection of a Personal Injury Law
Firm, 51 A.B.A.J. 929 (1965).
8 See generally Honoroff v. State Bar, 50 Cal. 2d 202, 323 P.2d 1003 (1958);
Ingersoll v. Coal Creek Coal Co., 117 Tenn. 262, 98 S.W. 178 (1906); Annot., 67
A.L.R.2d 859 (1959); Luther, Legal Ethics: The Problem of Solicitation, 44 A.B.A.J.
554 (1958).
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1906 New York case9 where the practice was soundly condemned,
the court even declaring it criminal. The term "ambulance
chasing" is derived from the ". . . unseemly activity of overzealous
undertakers in too promptly soliciting contracts in their line of
business... ."o As generally applied today the phrase designates the
activities of those who acquaint themselves with the occurrence of
accidents and approach injured persons with a view toward employ-
ment regarding litigation arising from the accident." The phrase has
been applied to an agent employed by a lawyer12 as well as the
lawyer himself,s3 but this comment is restricted to the problems
arising from the solicitation of personal injury litigation by the
practicing attorney.1 4
The near unanimity of court decisions in denouncing the practice
of "ambulance chasing" is striking. Such decisions may be based
upon encouraging public confidence and personal integrity, obviating
potential harm to the client, precluding division among members of
the bar, or averting the general impairment of justice. 5 However,
they all reach the same conclusion: Such active solicitation of
business by attorneys is condemned. The penalties imposed upon a
guilty attorney are sometimes severe. In some jurisdictions statutes
forbid soliciting by making any violation a misdemeanor.' 8 In all
jurisdictions it is the inherent power of the court to punish those
members of the bar who violate the general prohibitions against
solicitation and unethical conduct.1 7
9 In re Clark, 184 N.Y. 222, 233, 77 N.E. 1, 5 (1906).
10 Kelley v. Boyne, 239 Mich. 204, 214 N.W. 316, 318 (1927).
11 Doughty v. Grills, 37 Tenn. App. 63, 260 S.W.2d. 379, 387 (1952). For a
detailed description of "ambulance chasing" see In re Bar of City of New York, 222
App. Div. 580, 581-2, 227 N.Y.S. 1, 3 (1928).
12 See In re Newell, 174 App. Div. 94, 160 N.Y.S. 275, 278 (1916), in which the
court states "ambulance chaser" is a proper name for anyone who solicits negligence
cases for an attorney.
13 State ex rel. Sorenson v. Goldman, 127 Neb. 340, 255 N.W. 32 (1934).
14 The justification for distinguishing between the two types of soliciting is
threefold:
1. Some courts have recognized a difference. Chreste v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky.
77, 186 S.W. 919, 926 (1916).
2. The California legislature has dealt specifically with solicitation for attorneys
by lay agents. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6076 (West 1962) (Rule 3).
3. The ABA CODE has dealt with each problem separately. See Disciplinary
Rule 2-103(A) (re personal solicitation by attorneys) and Disciplinary Rule
2-103(B) (re compensating lay agents for referrals).
15 See In re Katzka, 225 App. Div. 250, 232 N.Y.S. 575, 578 (1929), wherein
the court states: "This 'business of ambulance chasing' makes it generally impossible
for an attorney to give honorable service to clients and courts." For another court's
opinion of the evils involved, see In re Bar of City of New York, 222 App. Div. 580,
227 N.Y.S. 1 (1928).
10 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6153 (West 1962); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 877.01
(West 1965); CONN. GzE. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-86, 51-87 (West 1960).
17 7 Am. Ju. 2d Attorneys at Law § 15 (1963). 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client
I 18a (1937). CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6087, 6100 (West 1962).
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COMMENTS
STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF RULES LIMITING
SOLICITATION-SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS
Client solicitation by attorneys may detrimentally affect the
profession in two distinct areas. These are: 1) Breach of the lawyer's
duty to his client; and 2) Impairment of the administration of
justice. s
Breach of the Lawyer's Duty to his Client
There are few who would dispute the contention that the
interests of the client are the paramount concern of the attorney in
litigating a case. Therefore, condemnation of "ambulance chasing"
is based primarily on its detrimental effect upon the individual
client. Critics point to contingent fee abuses as a prime example of
this neglect of duty.'9
In personal injury litigation it is the lawyer's obligation to
obtain just compensation for his client's injuries. Yet an unscrupulous
attorney who circumvents established rules of custom and practice
might be tempted to proceed in the manner which will prove most
financially rewarding to him. If a lawyer should obtain a large case
load by soliciting, he may find it to his personal benefit to settle
cases in the easiest possible manner. Thus, the client's well-being
becomes a secondary factor in the mind of the unscrupulous attorney.
Active solicitation can quickly develop into a highly competi-
tive system with large monetary rewards going to the victorious.2"
Implicit in this competition is the attempt to contact a potential
client at the earliest possible moment. Overreaching,21 as this early
solicitation is termed, may take place at a hospital or even at the
scene of the accident itself.22 At such times the victim of an accident
is rarely in a position to bargain with a high pressure salesman
posing as an attorney. Forcing a contract upon such an emotionally
and physically debilitated person is clearly incompatible with any
code, written or unwritten, of professional standards.
18 See Legal Ethics-Ambulance Chasing, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 182 (1955);
Luther, Legal Ethics: The Problem of Solicitation, 44 A.B.A.J. 554 (1958).
19 Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491, 505 (1959) (dissent).
20 An example of the competitive aspect of obtaining personal injury cases may
be seen in Simpson, State Bar Acts on Ambulance Chasers, 9 LA. BAR BULL. 249
(1934), where it is stated that one injured party reported that he had been solicited
by no less than twenty-five groups.
21 "Overreaching" means to take unfair advantage of another in a transaction
by cunning, cheating, or sharp practice. In re Baruch's Will, 205 Misc. 1122, 1124,
132 N.Y.S.2d 402, 405 (Sur. Ct. 1954).
22 Mitton v. State Bar, 49 Cal. 2d 686, 321 P.2d 13 (1958) (solicitation in
hospital). See also Ingersoll v. Coal Creek Coal Co., 117 Tenn. 263, 98 S.W. 178
(1906) (lawyers approached widows of mine oxplopiop victims).
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Impairment of the Administration of Justice
While neglect of the attorney's duty to fairly represent his
client may prove especially harmful to the affected party, the
impairment of the administration of justice that occurs when solicita-
tion of personal injury litigation goes unchecked affects society as a
whole. Stirring up litigation solely for the purpose of adding to the
income of a particular lawyer is reprehensible conduct.23 The extra
litigation that would follow in the absence of controls over soliciting
would contribute heavily to the already congested court calendars,24
creating a backlog of cases which would seriously impair judicial
proceedings.
An additional evil that cannot be overlooked is the possibility
of perjured and manufactured evidence. It has been suggested that
the lawyers who ignore the ethical standards of their profession might
also manufacture evidence to ensure a favorable verdict: " 'It is but
a short step from exaggeration of injury to the manufacture of a
claim . . . .2 ,25
A final argument against solicitation is that, left unchecked,
soliciting attorneys will siphon off all the business in an area. This
would tend to be self-expanding, especially where the soliciting is
well-organized. Competition in such an area would be restricted to
those with the strongest, most efficient organizations. The indepen-
dent legal practitioner would find himself driven out of business by
those who actively participate in solicitation. Thus, if solicitation of
personal injury litigation were left unchecked, all of the aforemen-
tioned evils would abound in a self-perpetuating morass of legal
chicanery, competition and excessive litigation.
Such are the arguments given by those who advocate strict
regulation of direct solicitation by an attorney. While the great
weight of legal authority draws upon these arguments to conclude
that this practice is an evil which must be controlled or eliminated,2
strict enforcement of rules against solicitation creates other evils
which may be equally detrimental to the bar and the public.27
23 Furthermore, critics are quick to point out that it has never been a defense to
a charge of barratry that the suit was well-founded. Annot., 139 A.L.R. 620, 622
(1942). In California the common law definition of barratry has been codified and
made punishable as a misdemeanor. CAL. PEN. CODE § 158 (West 1970).
24 For the problem in California, see 1970 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, at 77.
See also Landis, Jury Trials and the Delay of Justice, 56 A.B.A.J. 950 (1970).
25 20 THE GREEN BAG 145 (1908).
26 See note 8 supra.
27 See Brennan, The Bugaboo "Ambulance Chasing," 6 CAL. S.B.J. 37 (1931).
This article encourages the direct solicitation of clients by attorneys, but drew sharp
criticism in three later articles. The author of the final article declared that "the
views expressed in that article are so very objectionable that I venture to add a third
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STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF RULES LIMITING
SOLICITATION-HARMFUL EFFECTS
Effect upon Potential Clients
In direct opposition to a basic argument against soliciting
personal injury litigation, those who oppose strict enforcement be-
lieve solicitation is necessary to protect the client's interests. Those
advocating this line of reasoning point out that the business so gained
is beneficial to the injured, the sick, the poor, and the needy.2"
In the absence of litigation initiated by an attorney, the injured party
might be forced to reach his own settlement. It is not unreasonable
to assume that the layman would generally have a more difficult
time obtaining adequate compensation for his injuries than would an
attorney. Consequently, solicitation by the lawyer should help the
injured party receive his just compensation.
While the American courts have gone far to provide an
attorney for anyone accused of a crime, no such constitutional right
is guaranteed to those in a civil action. Opponents of the sanctions
against "ambulance chasing" are of the opinion that if the client
cannot go to the attorney because of his injury, lack of education or
poverty, then it is the duty of the attorney to approach him. Few
would comdemn as unethical an attorney's accepting a client who had
been recommended to him by a mutual friend.29 However, organiza-
tions formed to seek out needy parties and channel them to compe-
tent lawyers have been universally condemned." Additionally, the
lawyer who pursues such persons on his own is subject to public
censure.
31
Perhaps the greatest danger perpetuated by strictly enforcing
the sanctions restricting solicitation is allowing unscrupulous claims
agents to obtain premature and unreasonable releases. 2 If the
protest against them." Hart, Ambulance Chasing, 6 CAL. S.B.J. 79 (1931). See also
Crum, Clean Up the Legal Profession, 6 CAL. S.B.J. 54 (1931); Berry, The Bugaboo,
"Ambulance Chasing," 6 CAL. S.B.J. 66 (1931).
28 MATHEWS, supra note 4, at 16.
29 "The friends, acquaintances and associates of an attorney have the unques-
tioned right to sound his praises and divert to him such clients as they can persuade
in a legitimate way to engage his services." Chreste v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 77,
98, 186 S.W. 919, 926 (1916).
30 Such an organization is not to be confused with a lawyer referral service
which does no more than refer to attorneys clients who state they have a need. See
note 50 infra. See also Hilderbrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950) ;
In re Maclub of America, Inc., 295 Mass. 45, 3 N.E.2d 272 (1936); In re Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958); People ex rel.
Chicago Bar Association v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 Ill. 50, 199 N.E. 1 (1935).
31 In Chreste v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 77, 186 S.W. 919, 926 (1916), the
court states there is a manifest difference between securing clients on one's own and
hiring agents to solicit business.
32 See generally Bearor v. Kapple 24 N.Y.S.2d 655 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (insurance
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injured party is represented by counsel, the situation is similar to a
criminal case wherein the attorney's first advice to his client is-
"Don't say anything." In a personal injury situation, the attorney
advises his client-"Don't sign anything." If a lawyer and a claims
agent were both witnesses to an accident involving an injury to an
unknown party, the claims agent could, under existing law, approach
the injured party and settle his claim on the spot, whereas the
attorney would be forced to stand idly by and hope the victim sought
his counsel." This situation constitutes an inequity the law should
correct.
An additional element that may harm the case of the potential
client is that the claims agent is informed of the accident soon after
its occurrence. He can then approach the victim, check with wit-
nesses, examine the scene of the accident or even fabricate a
favorable case. Meanwhile, the victim may be incapacitated and
unable to enlist the aid of an attorney. Even if the victim does not
settle with the person who caused his injury or sign a release, it
may be weeks or even months before he realizes that he needs an
attorney. By this time witnesses may have moved or become biased
by previous questions from the defendant, and much of the evidence
may no longer be available. This places the plaintiff's case in a com-
promising position which could have been avoided had he been
preparing his case from the day of the accident as had the defendant.
Thus, the strict enforcement of rules against soliciting may
detrimentally affect the welfare of a potential litigant. However, the
inequities of strict enforcement may go beyond the realm of the
individual litigant to actually affect the members of the bar.
Effect upon Members of the Bar
A sound, workable system for administrating justice is only
possible where all members of the bar are entitled to the same
rights. Arbitrary discrimination against certain legal practitioners is
sure to create disharmony which is difficult to justify. None would
dispute that lawyers may use different methods, and that some
adjuster called upon victim same day as accident and told him to sign release or go
to jail); Thorne v. Columbia Cab Corp., 167 Misc. 72, 3 N.Y.S.2d 537 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1938) (insurance adjuster entered hospital to get seriously injured victim to sign
release for $35 while victim was in such condition as not to realize the significance
of the transaction). See also In re Cohn, 10 Ill. 2d 186, 139 N.E.2d 301 (1957)(specially concurring opinion). The court said: "Nevertheless, solicitation of per-
sonal injury cases is the natural reflex or defensive response to the unfair methods
of claim adjusters, just as naturally as the human organism elaborates its own anti-
bodies to combat disease." Id. at 306.
83 This is because the claims agent is not subject to the same codes of ethics
and disciplinary rules as the attorney. See notes 2 and 3 supra.
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lawyers have deservedly acquired fine reputations, but there is no
place in an efficient organization for selective and arbitrary rules
which discriminate against a particular segment of that organization.
Every lawyer solicits. The young practitioner would probably
starve if he did not. Some lawyers may join clubs to make business
contacts. Some may take advantage of church membership to
increase business. A clever lawyer may offer free advice to potential
clients in the hope of being retained in a more lucrative matter.
Lawyers are businessmen out to procure all the business they can
handle. Thus, an enterprising attorney might offer a corporate execu-
tive tickets for the World Series. Or he might attempt placing
himself in a bank president's golf foursome so that he may casually
mention an "interesting" tax case while he and his partner are
strolling from tee to green. Such obvious examples of solicitation are
rarely subject to censure. Yet an attorney faces disbarment if he tells
an illiterate that his injuries are worth more than the pittance offered
him by the claims adjuster. The various codes of ethics and profes-
sional responsibility are not worded specifically to restrict only
personal injury solicitation, yet such is their practical effect.8
4
Another consideration is that these sanctions may unfairly
prevent a young lawyer from advertising or otherwise trying to obtain
business. One of the arguments supporting the restrictions is that
solicitation would result in all the business in any given area going
to the firm with the best organized system of soliciting. Yet without
solicitation the most established and familiar firms get the majority
of the business, and these are not necessarily the most competent.
It has even been suggested that rules of ethics forbidding advertise-
ment and solicitation are formulated and kept alive by established
lawyers who no longer need to rely on such activities. 5 If this is
true, the harmful effects are obvious and the need for improvement
is clear.
CURRENT TRENDS IN PERSONAL INJURY
LITIGATION
The problem propounded by the foregoing discussion is: How
can the bar prohibit attorneys from demeaning the profession by
34 This line of reasoning has been suggested because personal injury attorneys
are condemned much more harshly for their soliciting than others. See MATHEWS,
supra note 4, at 15.
85 "Does it not seem, everything considered, that these rules of professional
conduct were enacted by the big law firm and big interests in their own interests,
and to the disadvantage of the poor and independent lawyer?" Brennan, The Buga-
boo "Ambulance Chasing," 6 CAL. S.B.J. 37, 40 (1931).
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active solicitation yet adequately protect the public from abuses in
personal injury settlements?
California has taken some action by passing legislation for-
bidding solicitation by attorneys and enforcing this prohibition by
imposition of the criminal sanction. 6 California has also attempted
to deal with the problem by rendering void any retainers or contracts
obtained by an attorney's agents.8 Thus, in California and other
jurisdictions which have adopted similar statutes, a soliciting attorney
may not only be the holder of a worthless contract, but he may also
find himself criminally liable for his actions.
The various statutes, state rules, and the American Bar Associa-
tion's Code of Professional Responsibility are also intended to
alleviate the problems involved in settling personal injury claims. 8
These canons are enforced by the inherent power of the courts over
those who practice before them. 9 The practitioner found guilty of
soliciting may be censured,4° suspended,4 or disbarred,42 depending
upon the gravity of his offense. Since an attorney is licensed as an
officer of the court according to the rules and principles of his
particular state bar, he is subject to its legal and ethical standards.43
Any violation Of these standards may precipitate an action against
him by the court. The justification for leaving this power in the courts
is evidenced by Justice Cardozo's statement: "If the house is to be
cleaned, it is for those who occupy and govern it, rather than for
strangers, to do the noisome work."44
Unfortunately, these and other proposed solutions45 deal solely
with the ethical conduct of attorneys. In order to deal effectively
with the problem, it is necessary to do more than merely punish an
attorney for his direct soliciting. The incentive must be taken out of
"ambulance chasing," and the client, as well as members of the legal
profession, must be fully protected. If this can be done, difficulties
would be diminished and cases of overreaching and other abuses
could be more effectively handled. This may not be as difficult as it
86 See note 16 supra.
37 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6154 (West 1962).
88 ABA CODE, Ethical Consideration 2-9, Disciplinary Rule 2-103(A). Guides
to Professional Conduct for the New California Practitioner (1961), Chap. One (1).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6076 (Rules 2 and 3) (West 1962).
89 See note 17 supra.
40 In re Cohn, 10 Ill. 2d 186, 139 N.E.2d 301 (1957).
41 Mitton v. State Bar, 49 Cal. 2d 686, 321 P.2d 13 (1958).
42 In re Welch, 156 App. Div. 470, 141 N.Y.S. 381 (1913).
43 See Librarian v. State Bar, 21 Cal. 2d 862, 865, 136 P.2d 321, 323 (1943). An
attorney is an officer of the court and must answer for any delinquencies. Brennan,
The Bugaboo "Ambulance Chasing," 6 CAL. S.B.J. 37 (1931).
44 People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 480, 162 N.E. 487, 493 (1928).
45 See note 18 supra.
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would first appear. To effect a solution, the entire problem must be
dealt with, not just an isolated part. As long as injured parties are
prey to unscrupulous settlement tactics, it is reasonable to assume
that attorneys will continue flaunting the rules to help those victims
obtain their adequate rewards.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Judicial Supervision
Judicial supervision of fees, releases, and settlements would
appear to be a very desirable check upon abuses in personal injury
litigation. In this manner the court could examine all the circum-
stances surrounding a particular case. The court could review the
amount of the fee and how it was obtained, determine whether or not
the actions of the claims agent were justified, and check to see if
there is any evidence of unconscionable contracts or unjust settle-
ments. -This would also permit the court to scrutinize the work of
those attorneys and insurance companies who handle a great pro-
portion of the personal injury work in an area, ensuring their
tactics are legally and ethically acceptable. While judicial supervi-
sion would necessarily increase the work load of the court,4" the
disadvantage would hopefully be outweighed by the fact that any
unfair tactics employed by either the claims representatives or the
attorneys would surely surface in the course of timely judicial
surveillance.
Advertising and Referral Through Local Bar Associations
It seems only logical that if the bar refuses to allow attorneys
to solicit business on their own, then it should take upon itself this
responsibility.47 This should not be an attempt to drum up business,
but should be a concentrated effort to educate the public as to its
rights involving personal injury settlements.4 Education has long
46 To reduce this burden, limits could be placed upon fees, releases and settle-
ments which necessitate judicial supervision. For example fees and settlements
obtained in excess of $500 could be made subject to review, as could releases signed
when the injured party has been hospitalized. The parties would file with the court a
statement of the facts and the amount of settlement and fees, with all concerned
parties attesting the document. The court, soley at its discretion, could demand further
investigation.
47 "It is not only the right but the duty of the profession as a whole to utilize
such methods as may be developed to bring the services of its members to those who
need them, so long as this can be done ethically and with dignity." ABA OPINION
320 (1968). ABA OPINION 423 (1970) states that it is proper for a bar association to
warn the public against settling personal injury claims without the assistance of an
attorney.
48 "Over a period of years institutional advertising of programs for the benefit
1971]
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been recognized as an integral part of the duties of the bar and it
has been considered effective in promoting the public interest.49
By this method the public may more readily recognize its legal
alternatives and, in applicable cases, the need for competent coun-
sel. 50
The local bar association could then assist the public in finding
such attorneys by establishing a referral service which would direct
a person in need to a capable attorney."' Any lawyer interested in
handling such litigation could place his name with the referral service
which would then fairly distribute the requests it receives.
Such activities by local bar associations would go far toward
eliminating the problem of soliciting personal injury litigation and
protecting the accident victim. Advertising by the bar would explain
the problem and educate the public as to the proper course of con-
duct. A referral service of all competent lawyers interested in
handling personal injury litigation would assist the public in con-
tacting and retaining an attorney should the need arise. Furthermore,
this same referral system would tend to impartially parcel out the
cases so that no attorney would be forced to advertise or unethically
solicit business on his own.
Statutes to Curb Abuses
As has been mentioned, California has enacted certain statutes
to curb abuses in personal injury litigation.52 While these initial
gestures may be laudable, much more is needed. The California
legislature should direct itself toward legislation which not only
prohibits the lawyer from soliciting, but also restricts the claims
representative from obtaining an unjust settlement or release.53
of the public have been approved by this and other Ethics Committees as well as by
the courts. . . ." ABA OPiNioN 307 (1962). As to how far the bar may go in its
advertising, see J. Blakslee, Notes on Ethics, 53 A.B.A.J. 747 (1967).
49 "Advertising which is calculated to teach the layman the benefits and advan-
tages of preventive legal services will benefit the lay public and enable the lawyer to
render a more desirable and beneficial professional service ... " ABA OPzNioN 179
(1938).
50 "The need of members of the public for legal services is met only if they
recognize their legal problems, appreciate the importance of seeking assistance, and
are able to obtain the services of acceptable legal counsel. Hence, important functions
of the legal profession are to educate laymen to recognize their legal problems, to
facilitate the process of intelligent selection of lawyers, and to assist in making legal
services fully available." ABA CODE, Ethical Consideration 2-1.
51 Such lists are generally recognized as proper. ABA CODE, Disciplinary Rule
2-103(D) (3). ABA OPINioN 227 (1941).
52 See notes 16 and 37 supra.
53 Legislation which would require placing a bold face clause on any settlement
or release agreement recommending that the injured party confer with an attorney
before settling his claim would be insufficient. This would undoubtedly prove in-
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Such dual-purpose legislation would act directly to protect the injured
party, and would indirectly tend to eliminate "ambulance chasing"
as the practice would no longer be either necessary or profitable.
New York has adopted such a statute.54 In essence it provides
that it is unlawful for any person to enter a hospital to obtain a
settlement or release for personal injuries within 15 days after the
injuries were sustained, unless the injured party has given at least
5 days prior written notice of his willingness to participate in such
settlement or release. New York has made violation of this statute a
misdemeanor.55 The New York courts have noted that this statute
was enacted in order to protect the injured party from being
victimized, harassed and exploited by unscrupulous claims agents.56
While the New York statute is an admirable start, it does not go
far enough. It protects the injured party from the claims adjusters
but does not protect him from over-zealous attorneys. By also
excluding lawyers from contacting accident victims, the statute
would greatly retard active solicitation by attorneys.
The New York statute has proven to be too confining in its
limitation of the protected areas to hospitals. There is some confusion
in New York courts as to whether or not a house constitutes an area
which is protected by the statute.57 The statute should apply when-
ever confinement under a doctor's orders is reasonably warranted,
regardless of the place of confinement. This latter provision would
protect someone approached either before medical help was obtained
or when it could not be afforded.
Finally, more strength could be given to the statute by making
any releases, settlements, or contracts for employment obtained in
violation of the statute voidable at the option of either the injured
effective in reducing abuses, for the injured party is often in no condition to realize
the significance of his act much less read a contract. See note 32 supra.
54 "It shall be unlawful for any person to enter a hospital for the purpose of
negotiating a settlement or obtaining a general release or statement, written or oral,
from any person confined in said hospital or sanitarium as a patient, with reference
to any personal injuries for which said person is confined in said hospital or sanitarium
within fifteen days after the injuries were sustained, unless at least five days prior to
the obtaining or procuring of such general release or statement such injured party has
signified in writing his willingness that such general release or statement be given. This
section shall not apply to a person entering a hospital for the purpose of visiting a
person therein confined, as his attorney or on behalf of his attorney." N.Y. JUDIcARY
LAW § 480 (McKinney 1968).
55 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 485 (McKinney 1968).
56 Bearor v. Kapple, 24 N.Y.S.2d 655, 658 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
57 "A sick person in his home is just as much a sick person if confined in a
hospital or sanitarium." Id. at 658. For opposite conclusion, see Meehan v. McCloy
et al., 266 App. Div. 706, 40 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1943).
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party or the court, where justice would so dictate.5" This provision,
like criminal punishment, would work as an added deterrent to such
inequitable conduct.5" Few claims adjusters or attorneys would risk
criminal liability merely to obtain what could become a worthless
scrap of paper. Claims adjusters and attorneys could eliminate any
uncertainty as to the validity of a signed document or fear of
personal criminal liability merely by complying with the statute's
reasonable provisions.
Proposed Statute
Thus, the proposed California statute would use the New York
statute as its model, but introduce modifications to clarify the law
and fill certain voids which appear in the New York law. The text of
the complete statute would read as follows:
1. It shall be unlawful for any person to negotiate a settle-
ment or obtain a release, statement, or retainer, written or oral,
from any person confined as a patient under orders from a doctor
or in such condition as to warrant confinement were medical care
available, with reference to any personal injury for which said
person is confined within 15 days after the injuries were sustained,
unless at least 5 days prior to the obtaining or procuring of such
settlement, release, statement, or retainer such injured party has
signified in writing his willingness that such settlement, release,
statement or retainer be given.
2. Any violation of Section 1 shall make any settlement,
release, or retainer voidable at the option of either the injured
party or the court, where justice would so dictate, and any state-
ment obtained in violation of the above shall be inadmissible in
any court of law where justice would so dictate.
3. Any violation of Section 1 shall be punishable as a mis-
demeanor.
CONCLUSION
While solicitation of personal injury litigation by attorneys is
an evil the bar should control, strict enforcement of the sanctions
against soliciting may cause corresponding problems. The bar must
recognize its responsibility to protect the members of the public
from abuse in all fields of law, including the area of personal injury
58 This would permit the court to hold the settlement, release or retainer invalid
when the injured party could not do so himself, for reasons such as death, mental
incapability, lingering coma, etc.
59 The New York courts have consistently held that violation of the statute
does not make the release void. See Moses v. Carver, 164 Misc. 204, 298 N.Y.S.2d
378 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Albarello v. Meier, 5 Misc. 2d 193, 159 N.Y.S.2d 761 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1957).
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litigation. While the bar should continue enforcing its codes of pro-
fessional responsibility, it could make great strides toward curbing
solicitation by attorneys and abuses in personal injury litigation by
encouraging judicial surveillance of personal injury settlements,
initiating relevant advertising, establishing the formation of per-
sonal injury lawyer referral services, and promoting the adoption
of a statute to protect the public such as has been proposed. These
steps would not only enhance the integrity of the legal profession,
but eliminate many of the inequities in the problem area of personal
injury litigation.
J. Timothy Philibosian
